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MULTINATIONALS REVISITED
elohn M. Niehuss*
STORM OVER THE MULTINATIONALS-THE REAL ISSUES.

By

Raymond Vernon. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
1977. Pp. vii, 260. $12.50.
So much has been published on multinational corporations
in recent years that one is inclined to pass over any new book on
the subject for one in a more topical, less examined area. It would,
however, be a mistake to miss Professor Vernon's Storm over the
Multinationals-The Real Issues. This is not just another book on
multinationals. It is the readable and carefully researched effort
of one of the world's acknowledged experts on multinationals. As
such, it deserves to be studied by anyone remotely interested in
the future of international business.
Vernon has written extensively on multinationals, and his
major work, Sovereignty at Bay, contributed to the concern in the
early 1970s that multinationals were about to overwhelm the nations of the world. 1 His objective in writing yet another book on
multinationals was "to help the reader who is trying to keep his
head above the flood" (p. v.). The book does just that; and it is
unfortunate that it, rather than Sovereignty at Bay, did not appear earlier, as its measured approach might have helped minimize the unsupported polemic and near hysteria over multinationals in the early 1970s.
Since those days, the controversy over multinationals has so
waned that C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury: could note: "Fortunately, popular alarm over the power
and growth of multinational firms has substantially abated during the past few years. It is now recognized-for better or for
worse-that most governments are able to deal effectively with
these firms. Hysteria over the 'global reach' of multinationals is
much abated." 2 In this relatively quiet atmosphere, the turmoil
and turbulence of "the MNC issue" in the early 1970s is often
forgotten; a capsule review of recent history may help put Ver* Member, New York and Ohio Bars. B.A. 1958, Amherst College; J.D. 1962, Univer•
sity of Michigan.-Ed.
1. R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY (1971).
2. "The International Investment Policy of the United States," Remarks by the Hon.
C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs before the
Fordham Corporate Law Institute, New York, N.Y., reprinted in Dept. of Treasury News
Release B-1262 at 6 (Nov. 14, 1978).
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non's analysis in better perspective.
Scholars first intensified their study of the multinationals in
the late 1960s and early 1970s.3 The American labor movement
picked up the issue in the early 1970s and pushed the BurkeHartke Bill as a means to minimize the alleged evils of the multinationals;' business responded by proposing codes of good conduct for corporations and governments. 5 Legislative bodies also
began hearings and other investigations on multinational activities, 6 while governnients 7 and international organizations8
established task forces, special commissions, and advisory committees. All of this activity created what Vernon aptly calls the
"storm" over the multinationals. For several years, opponents
and defenders of multinationals traded charges and counter3. For a general discussion of the basic legal issues see Hadari, The Structure of the
Priuate Multinational Enterprise (pt. 1), 71 MICH. L. R.Ev. 729 (1973); Hadari, The Choice
of Law Applicable to the Multinational Enterprise and the Nationality of Such
Enterprises (pt. 2), 1974 DUKE L.J. 1; Rubin, Multinational Enterprise and National
Souereignty: A Skeptic's Analysis, 3 LAW AND POLY. !NTL. Bus. 1 (1971); Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARv. L. REv. 739 (1970).
For bibliographies of works on multinational corporation issues see S. LEA & S. WEBLEY,
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1973); Centre on Transnational
Corporations, Survey of Research on Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/3
(1977).
4. Proposed Foreign Trade and Investment Act of 1972, S. 2592, H.R. 10914, 92d
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1971-1972). See 117 CONG. REc. 33,583 for an introductory statement by Senator Hartke and a summary of the Burke-Hartke proposals. See also 1972
Economic Report and the President, Part I, Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 181-90 (1972) (discussion by Arthur Burns).
·
5. In November 1972 the Council of the International Chamber of Commerce adopted
a set of comprehensive "Guidelines for International Investment" which dealt with many
of the multinational-related issues being discussed and debated at the time.
6. E.g., A Foreign Economic Policy for the 1970's, Hearings on the Multinational
Corporation and International Inuestment Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Econ. Policy
of the Joint Econ. Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Multinational Corporations and
United States Foreign Policy, Hearings on the International Telephone and Telegraph Co.
and Chile, 1970-71, Before the Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. (1973); U.S. TARIFF COMM. REPORT TO
THE COMM. ON FINANCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE AND ITS SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE, 930 CONG,, 1ST SESS., ON lMPIJCATIONS OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS FOR WORLD TRADE
AND lNvESTMENT AND FOR U.S. TRADE AND LABOR (Comm. Print 1973).
7. E.g., U.S. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL lNvESTMENT, Tm: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION-STUDIES ON U.S. FOREIGN lNvESTMENT (March 1972); TASK FORCE ON THE STRUCTURE
OF CANADIAN OOUSTRY, REPORT ON FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN
INDUSTRY (1968) (also known as the Watkins Report); GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, FOREIGN
DIRECT lNvESTMENT IN CANADA (1972) (also known as the Gray Report).
8. See, e.g., Department of Economic & Social Affairs, Multinational Corporations
in World Development, U.N. Doc. ST/ECN190 (1973); Department of Economic & Social
Affairs, The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International
Relations, U.N. Doc. E/5500/Rev. 1-ST/ESN6 (1974).
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charges, and thousands of man-hours were consumed arguing
the pros and cons of the question. Storm over the Multinationals
would have been a useful addition to this debate as it helps
"filter out the polemic and the propaganda" (p. v) and provides
an analytic framework that abhors cliches and identifies the truly
unique aspects of a business operating simultaneously in several
countries.
Vernon's basic premise is that the tension between multinationals and nations is caused by two completely different sets of
problems which should be analyzed separately (pp. 11-12). The
first set includes those broad structural and political problems
arising out of the smaller and more interdependent world which
improved communications, travel, computers, and technology
have created. This smaller world has led to rising nationalism,
efforts of various countries to assert economic hegemony, and a
number of problems associated with increased economic interdependence and industrialization (pp.191-93). Vernon believes that
the multinational corporation has regrettably symbolized these
problems because many wrongly believe that the multinationals
produced them. In fact, the existence of multinationals is due, in
large part, to the same basic factors which have created the new
structural and political problems. As Vernon notes, the multinational is "much more a manifestation of the trend than a cause"
(p. 212). Since these problems are not caused by multinationals,
Vernon argues, it is wrong to try to cure them by restraining
multinationals. In short, he implies that much of the "storm"
over the multinationals results from blaming multinationals for
problems they did not create and that our fascination with the
multinational corporation may keep us from solving the broader,
basic problems economic interdependence and industrialization
cause.
On the other hand, Vernon does recognize a second set of
problems which can be attributed to the growth, structure, and
strategies of the multinational corporation (p. 212). The fact that
the multinational operates simultaneously in home and host nations gives it a "split personality" or a "double identity." Many
multinational business strategies combine with this multinational character to create conflicts with the countries in which
they operate. Vernon discusses three illustrative multinational
strategies: the desire to innovate to increase sales and profits; the
drive to maintain stability in the face of competitive challenges
to market position; and the attempt to avoid corporate decline
when faced with potential new entrants to the corporation's market. As Vernon explains in some detail, decisions implementing
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these strategies cause problems in the home and host countries
over (1) the location of research and development projects and the
manufacture of new products, (2) the tendency to spread operations over many products and many countries in order to maintain corporate stability, and (3) the practice of combatting entropy by surrendering old product lines and starting new ones.
Within developed countries, the tensions between multinationals and home and host countries are particularly acute for
such areas and issues as national security, employment security,
labor relations and collective bargaining, transfer pricing and the
allocation of costs and profits for tax purposes, balance-of, payments and capital-movement policy, antitrust, and allocating
access to raw materials. When the multinational operates in developing countries, it faces a somewhat greater degree of nationalism and frequently becomes the subject of ideological and political debates over such issues as the new international economic
order, permanent sovereignty over natural resources, economic
imperialism, the evils of capitalism and industrialization, appropriate technology, and the proper division of the benefits of multinational activities.
Because nations frequently have conflicting goals, the multinational corporation is often trapped in what is essentially a
disagreement between nations. A multinational must often juggle
the claims of national sovereigns through its corporate decisions
and actions. Vernon sees this as a unique problem and feels that
many of the recent efforts to ease the tension between multinationals and nations have been ineffective because by inadequately considering this dilemma of conflicting jurisdiction they
ignore the basic causes of such tension. When trying to devise
"solutions" to "multinational problems," Vernon suggests, the
broader set of structural and political problems (e.g., economic
interdependence and industrialization) cannot be solved by any
program aimed at the multinational enterprise alone (pp. 21112). Of those problems directly related to multinationals, conflicting jurisdiction is the most serious and immediate.
To cope with this problem and to help prevent an eruption
of beggar-thy-neighbor policies in the multinational and
international-investment areas, he suggests: (1) that national
authorities agree about the nature of needed public action; (2)
that national jurisdictions relating to multinational corporations
be disentangled and redirected; and (3) that an acceptable international regime be created (pp. 211-16).
Vernon feels that the current position of most developing
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countries will prevent an early consensus about what public action is needed. He believes that peer pressure forces those countries to maintain hostility toward multinationals which prevents
them from "bargaining realistically" in devising any international regime which, to be acceptable, would require them to
assume new obligations as well as receive new benefits (p. 214).
Thus, he concludes that, for the time being, any effective international cooperation must be among the developed countries,
and his starting point for discussing such cooperation is the
problem of conflicting national jurisdictions (p. 214).
In Sovereignty at Bay, Vernon outlined his recommendations
for a series of international commitments to reduce the problem
of overlapping jurisdiction. He recommended (1) agreements by
governments to give up the right to reach into the jurisdiction of
others to influence actions that they feel affect their national
interests; (2) international consultations to harmonize law and
policy in areas like restrictive business practices, extraterritorial
application of national security controls, and capital movements;
(3) that governments of parent companies deny diplomatic support for foreign subsidiaries; and (4) finding a means of ensuring
equitable treatment by host countries of foreign subsidiaries that
would no longer be protected by the governments of their home
state. 9 Unfortunately, Storm over the Multinationals adds little
to these recommendations, and the reader is left uncertain precisely how Vernon would treat some of the major problems of
"disentangling" national jurisdictions. Fortunately, in a recent
article in Foreign Policy, 10 Vernon expands on some of the ideas
first set forth in Sovereignty at Bay, and one can now piece together a reasonably clear picture of his proposals. For example,
in his Foreign Policy article he suggests that home-country governments should accept the principle that all foreign-owned subsidiaries lie wholly within the jurisdiction of the host country and
host governments should treat all such subsidiaries as national
enterprises. He adds that developing countries (including those
in Latin America) might be willing to give up the Calvo doctrine
(under which the laws of the host country, not international law,
govern disputes over foreign-owned subsidiaries) and to agree to
give foreign owners access to an international tribunal in return
for a commitment by the United States and other industrialized
9. R. VERNON, supra note 1, at 280.
10. Vernon, The Multinationals: No Strings Attached, 33 FOREIGN POLY. 121 (19781979).
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countries to "orphan" foreign subsidiaries by refusing them diplomatic protection, not exercising extraterritorial control over
them, and refraining from using them to intervene in the politics
of other countries. 11
Professor Vernon closes Storm over the Multinationals by
asserting that we need an "acceptable international regime" for
the multinational corporation. It is a frustrating place for an excellent book to leave an interested reader. Having come so far, the
reader might realistically expect at least· an outline of the kind
of regime Vernon believes necessary .. That Vernon closed
Sovereignty at Bay on a similar note is all the more reason for the
reader to expect some further discussion.
Vernon does make clear his belief that codes of conduct like
the one negotiated with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and being negotiated in the United
Nations are not very useful because they do not deal with the real
problems multinationals create. He believes that the drafters of
such codes misunderstand the problem, which is the conflict between the global strategy of the multinational a.nd the overlapping jurisdictions and differing objectives of the home and host
nations (p. 215). 12 However, Storm over the Multinationals would
have been far more useful had Vernon commented more specifically on the current OECD and UN attempts to regulate multinationals and had he evaluated more completely other proposals
concerning international investment (such as a GATI for investment, 13 an "escape clause" for investment, 14 an International Corporation Consultation Group, 15 a series of mini-codes in several
different areas,16 and a Charter for Global Corporations 17).
In fairness to Vernon, his views on most of these proposals
are set forth in his other works. For example, in Sovereignty at
Bay he dismisses the global corporation as "assuming the prob11. Id. at 129-32.
12. In addition, see id. at 133.
13. See Goldberg & Kindleberger, Toward a GA TT for Investment: A Proposal for
Supervision of the International Corporation, 2 LAW & POLY. lNTL. Bus. 295 (1970).
14. See Bergsten, Discussion, The Multinational Firm: Bane or Boom?, 28 J. FINANCE
457, 461-62 (1973); C. BERGSTEN, T. HORST & T. MORAN, AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS AND
AMERICAN INTERESTS 467-72 (1978).
15. See Rubin, supra note 3, at 36.
16. See INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 16 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as EcoNOMIC REPORT].
17. See Ball, Cosmocorp: The Importance of Being Stateless, 2 CoLUM. J. WoRLD Bus.
25 (1967). But see Rubin, Corporations and Society: The Remedy of Federal and International Incorporation, 23 AM. U.L. REV. 263 (1973).
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lem away," 18 and in his recent article in Foreign Policy one also
glimpses the kind of international regime he may have in mind.
In that article he notes:
What will eventually be required is the creation of a set of new
institutions at the international level that will collectively cover
the whole range of major relationships between business and government from drug labeling and pollution to taxes and competition.
Once the problem is perceived in its full dimensions, it will be
possible to face the disconcerting fact that each major subject may
call for a separately tailored institutional approach. After all,
within any national system, governments pursue their tax problems through one set of institutions, their competition problems
through another, their drug-labeling requirements through another, their environmental controls through still another, and so
on.•9

Ironically, this overall approach resembles the response of the
United States government in 1973-1974 to moves in the OECD
and the UN toward a single code of conduct for all multinational
activities. At that time, the United States urged the OECD to (1)
accept the principle of national treatment as the basis for regulating foreign investors, (2) review national investment policies (e.g.,
subsidies, tax incentives, and procurement regulations) that distort trade and investment patterns, and (3) begin to treat the
problems raised by multinationals in the established, specialized
OECD committees on taxation, restrictive business practices,
technology, and information disclosure. 20 Unfortunately, the
United States eventually acquiesced in a single multinational
code within the OECD, and the other members of the OECD
refused to accept any meaningful guidelines on national treatment and investment incentives. The result was the OECD
"Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises," which, as Vernon
notes, "still leave largely unresolved most of the underlying problems" (p. 203).
A clear presentation of an "acceptable international regime"
to deal with multinational issues would, I have said, have been
especially useful during the near hysteria of the early 1970s. On
the other hand, multinationals still exist-a bit more enlightened, perhaps, and certainly subject to increased public scrutiny
and regulation. Nations are still sovereign and are presumably
18. R. VERNON, supra note 1, at 272.
19. Vernon, supra note 10, at 133-34.
20. See ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 16, at 15-16.
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wiser and better informed as to the problems the multinationals
present. There are, moreover, still a few reminders of the earlier
turbulence. For example, the OECD "Guidelines" will be reviewed in June 1979; the Inter-Governmental Working Group on
a Code of Conduct established by the United Nation's Commission on Transnational Corporations is expected to produce a draft
code in early 1979; and substantial agreement has been reached
on an UNCTAD International Code of Conduct on the Transfer
of Technology.
Furthermore, controversial issues in international economics
appear incapable of permanent solution; they have ways of briefly
disappearing and suddenly reappearing. For example, waves of
protectionism periodically sweep the United States and other
industrialized nations; concerns over foreign investment in the
United States seem to rise and fall in roughly twenty-year cycles;
and there are recurring efforts to reform the world's international
monetary system. In the international investment area, the ITO
and GATT Conferences in 1947 and 1948 discussed rules designed
to regulate the restrictive business practices of companies doing
business abroad; and in the early 1950s ECOSOC proposed a set
of international antitrust rules. Neither the ITO Havana Charter
nor the ECOSOC rules were adopted, and international direct
investment and multinational issues were almost ignored until
the latest wave of attention in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Thus, history suggests that the present calm is simply a lull before another storm of activity over international investment and
multinationals.
One should not dwell too much on Vernon's failure to outline
an appropriate international regime more precisely or to evaluate
the many proposals for controlling multinationals. Vernon clearly
and admirably achieves his own goal by giving us a reasoned
"large perspective" on multinationals. I hope, though, that Vernon will soon give another of his now regular encores so that, when
the multinational storm clouds appear again, we will have the full
benefit of his recommendations on an international regime.

